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bstract
For two decades now, many banks in Africa have been holding large amounts of liquid assets. Prevailing explanations of this phenomenon rely
n credit rationing models. Yet, while modern models of financial intermediation show that high exposure to liquidity risk may prompt banks
o hoard large amounts of (precautionary) liquid reserves, this hypothesis has often been overlooked. We try to fill the gap in this paper. More
pecifically, we hypothesize and confirm that bank liquidity hoarding in Africa reflects, at least partially, a precautionary strategy to guard against
he risks associated with liquidity services to depositors.
 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
For two decades now, many banks in Africa have been holding
arge amounts of liquid assets (see, Caprio and Honohan, 1993;
reedman and Click, 2006; Saxegaard, 2006). For instance, over
he period 1990 and 2009, the ratio of liquid reserves to total
ssets for the median bank in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has
aried between 11% and 19%. In comparison, over the same
eriod, the liquid reserves to total assets ratio for the median
ank in OECD has not exceeded 5% (see Fig. 1).1
The issue of persistent large bank reserve holdings is critical,
specially in Africa where lack of finance if often cited as one
he most important constraints on the growth of firms (World
∗ Corresponding author at: 2276 Chemin St-Foy, Appt 406, Québec, QC G1V
S7, Canada. Tel.: +1 418 655 4570.E-mail addresses: vnketcha@yahoo.fr (P.V. Nketcha Nana),
ucie.Samson@ecn.ulaval.ca (L. Samson).
1 The statistics are from the World Development Indicators Database (WDI),
he World Bank.
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth institute.
879-9337 © 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier
.V.   
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2014.02.001
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ank, 2007). In fact, the accumulation of large bank reserves
isplaces funding which could be used to increase the supply
f credits to the private sector. It is thus important to find ways
f getting a greater share of bank resources flowing to support
rivate sector development.
Academics and policymakers are confronting this issue (see,
reedman and Click, 2006; Saxegaard, 2006; Honohan and
eck, 2007; Owoundi, 2009). Yet, the build-up of bank reserves
n many African countries has mostly been viewed as a conse-
uence of low levels of perceived expected returns on credit.2 In
articular, most authors base their analysis on credit rationing
odels (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990) and
uggest that efforts to address the credit market deficiencies
ould help increase the extent of bank intermediation.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that another
hannel may also be effective. More specifically, we hypothe-
ize and confirm that bank liquidity hoarding in Africa reflects, at
east partially, a precautionary strategy to guard against liquid-
ty risk. This result is consistent with the liquidity insurance
ole of banks as put forth by the modern theory of financial
ntermediation (see, Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983;
iamond and Rajan, 2001; Kashap et al., 2002; Tirole, 2011). It
2 This is related to credit market deficiencies such as the poor quality and
carcity of information about individual borrower risks, and the weak legal
nd judicial and contract enforcement infrastructures (see, Honohan and Beck,
007).
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tFig. 1. Median bank liquid reserves-to-bank assets ratio.
uggests that the share of deposits banks can channel into cred-
ts is constrained by the risks associated with liquidity services
o depositors.3 Our empirical analysis shows that a reduction of
eposit volatility, which is our primary measure of liquidity risk,
ill lead banks to significantly reduce their holdings of reserves
or precautionary motive. Consequently, it will help expand the
vailability of loanable funds and eventually the supply of credit
o the domestic private sector.
Besides this new result, our paper also contributes to the
iterature with a new measure that capture bank’s exposure to
iquidity risk. In fact, our primary measure of liquidity risk is
onstructed based on the standard deviation of deposit inflows.
n important feature of this indicator is that annual observations
re computed from monthly data, which allows us to exploit sub-
tantial variation in the time series of deposit inflows and, also,
o have a time-varying measure for our analysis. On other hand,
n indicator of bank’s exposure to liquidity risk based on the dis-
ribution of deposit inflows is especially relevant in the African
ontext, because, as documented in EIB (2013), deposits are the
ain source of banks’ liabilities in most African countries.
Finally, our paper is related to a recent strand of empirical
iterature that investigates the importance of the precautionary
otive in explaining the holding of bank reserves, by examin-
ng the build-up of bank reserves in developed countries since
he recent financial crisis (Ashcraft et al., 2009; Acharya and
errouche, 2012; Cornett et al., 2011). Like most of this lit-
rature, we find that there is a powerful relationship between
arge bank reserves and high exposure to liquidity risk; but our
ontribution is different as we are concerned with developing
ountries.
We are only aware of two papers, namely Agenor et al. (2004)
nd Saxegaard (2006), which carried out an empirical analysis
losely related to ours, most notably by their focus on develop-
ng countries: both papers estimate a demand function for excess
eserves (or liquid assets) by commercial banks that captures, in
articular, the precautionary motive for holding liquid assets.
evertheless, our contribution is different from theirs in the
3 In the next section, we present a collection of facts that suggest banks’
xposure to liquidity risk is particularly salient in much of SSA.
i
i
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pproach we use to capture liquidity risk. Moreover, both papers
elied on time series data and as such, their findings are likely
o suffer from the “individual heterogeneity bias” (see Baltagi,
008). By using panel data, we are able to control for country
pecific unobserved time-invariant variables; this enables us to
btain more reliable estimates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 moti-
ates the hypothesis of precautionary hoarding of bank liquidity
n Africa. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the
conometric analysis and results. Section 5 concludes.
.  Hypothesis  motivation
The hypothesis of precautionary hoarding of bank liquidity
ows from the modern theory of financial intermediation (e.g.,
ryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond and Rajan,
001; Kashap et al., 2002; Tirole, 2011). In this literature, the
undamental role of banks is to make illiquid loans to borrowers
hile providing liquidity on demand to depositors. This liquidity
nsurance role, however, exposes banks to liquidity risk: demand
or cash withdrawals may arrive before the loans mature and
orce banks to liquidate early and to fail. Hence, to carry out their
ob effectively, the models of financial intermediation show that
anks must invest in a certain costly volume of liquid assets as
 hedge against a state of the world where there are unexpected
emand for cash withdrawals.
A glance at banking systems in Africa shows that the
recautionary motive for banks to hoard liquidity may be espe-
ially important. For example, underdeveloped and unreliable
ayment systems in many countries are such that cash is largely
sed as medium of exchange. This implies that banks are likely to
ace frequent demand for cash withdrawals. In addition, the lack
f deposit insurance in several countries implies that there is a
ignificant risk that banks may unexpectedly face large outflows
f deposits (bank runs). Finally, the fact that capital markets are
ess developed suggests that banks cannot accommodate liquid-
ty shocks simply by raising new external finance on a moment’s
otice.4 In such a context, hoarding liquid assets is critical as a
trategy to mitigate the risk of liquidity shortage.
It is of course true that banks may resort to borrowing from
he central bank as a more or less permanent source of funds to
ope with liquidity shocks: banks can make use of the central
ank’s standing facilities to meet extraordinary liquidity needs at
 particular point in time. With this possibility, the precaution-
ry motive to hoard liquid assets may no longer be plausible.
owever, refinancing conditions are in principle determined by
he central banks. For example, virtually all liquidity provisions
y central banks are necessarily based on adequate collateral,
here the criteria of adequate collateral are defined by the cen-
ral banks. This implies that if a central bank is more conservative
n selecting the underlying collateral, banks would be restricted
n their access to refinancing facilities.
More formally, Nautz (1998) shows that bank’s demand
or liquid assets increases if access to central bank credits is
4 This point is stressed in Kashap et al. (2002) and in Tirole (2011).
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Baltensperger, 1980; Freixas and Rochet, 1997) point out two
other key determinants of precautionary cash holdings. First is
the opportunity cost of holding cash, that is the interest whichP.V. Nketcha Nana, L. Samson / Revie
xpected to become more restricted, and if the refinancing is
xpected to become more expensive. Accordingly, banks reduce
heir demand for liquid assets if expectations of future refinanc-
ng conditions become more optimistic. These results extend
arlier models (see, Poole, 1968; Baltensperger, 1980) in which
ank’s demand for liquid assets depends on the current refi-
ancing conditions set out by the central bank as follows: If the
enefits for a bank from resorting to central bank funds fail to
over the costs, banks reduce their demand for the central bank
unds and hold liquid assets large enough to make probability
f liquidity shortage negligible.
Hence, the view that the build-up of bank reserves in Africa
ay reflect high exposure to liquidity risk should not be dis-
arded without empirical evidence. While some authors (e.g.,
aprio and Honohan, 1993; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998;
onohan and Beck, 2007) do acknowledge this point, suppor-
ing empirical evidence is surprisingly lacking. This paper will
ry to fill the gap.
.  Data  and  descriptive  statistics
We use aggregate data at country-level. The following sub-
ection describes our liquidity risk variables, and the one after
hat describes the other variables included in the analysis. The
ast subsection presents the data and some descriptive statistics.
.1.  Liquidity  risk  factors
To capture withdrawal or liquidity risk in connection with
anks’ liabilities, our primary variable is a measure of the volatil-
ty of deposits. The rationale is simple: the greater banks are
ncertain on the volume of deposits they can raise in the near
uture, the more likely they will keep precautionary reserves high
nough so as to make the probability of liquidity shortage very
ow.5 One measure of such uncertainty for each period (year)
an be computed from monthly data as follows:
olt =
√
(1/(N  −  2))∑ (dtn −  dtn)2
μt
here t  is for years and n  for months;
tn = Log(Dtn) −  Log(Dt,n−1); dtn is the mean of dtn over
he N-months period t; μt = (1/N)
∑
Log(Dtn); Dtn is total bank
eposits of the nth-month of the period t.
For each year t, the numerator of Volt is the standard deviation
f monthly (logarithm of) deposits.6 It is normalized by the mean
f monthly (logarithm of) deposits for the same year, to ensure
omparison across countries (because deposits are measured in
ifferent units and currencies) and over time (because of widely
ifferent means).
But the volatility of deposits (Vol) may not be sufficient to
apture liquidity risk exposure. For one thing, it does not distin-
5 Note that deposits are the main source of banks’ liabilities in most African
ountries (EIB, 2013).
6 The data are in first differences changes to avoid potential issues associated
ith non-stationarity.
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uish between positive and negative changes in deposit inflows,
hereas the direction of change may be of critical importance.
n fact, positive variability is acceptable while variability on the
ownside may represent the worst scenario. Moreover, Vol  does
ot account for the possibility of highly asymmetric changes in
eposit inflows, whereas such asymmetry may impact liquidity
anagement decisions: positively (negatively) skewed7 deposits
mplies a probability of very large (low) amounts of deposit
nflows. Thus, with other things equal, the risk of liquidity short-
ge may be lower with greater positive skewness but higher
ith greater negative skewness. This implies that precaution-
ry reserves decreases as the distribution of deposit inflows
ecomes more positively skewed, but increases as the distribu-
ion of deposit inflows becomes more negatively skewed, ceteris
aribus.
On other hand, the structure of bank deposits may also be
elevant. In particular, demand deposits, unlike time and sav-
ng deposits, can be withdrawn at any time without any notice.
his implies that, at a given time, banks with large shares of
emand deposits are more likely to face large demand for cash
ithdrawals and may therefore need to hold large amounts of
recautionary reserves.
To take these few remarks into account, we consider three
dditional variables, namely the year average of monthly deposit
rowth, the skewness of monthly deposits (Skew), and the ratio of
emand to time and saving deposits. Regarding deposit skewness
Skew), it worth noting that while we would expect a negative
ssociation with reserves,8 we allow this relationship to be non-
inear over the whole range of possible values of Skew. In fact,
ince banks may have a preference for positive skewness – as
t would mean lower risk of liquidity shortage – the associa-
ion may be stronger for positive skewness (Skew  > 0) than for
egative skewness (Skew  < 0), on the average. This leads us to
onsider a dummy I(Skew  > 0), which is equals to 1 if the skew-
ess is positive, and include this in the regression along with
kew and the multiplicative interaction term Skew  * I(Skew  > 0).
To construct all the variables described in this sub-section,
e employ data on monthly deposits from the international
inancial Statistics (IFS) database.
.2.  Other  variables
Besides liquidity risk, cash holdings in the banking system
epends on other factors. In fact, models of bank reserves (see7 Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a probability distribution. It is
omputed as follows:
kew =
1
N
∑
(dti − dti)3(
1
N
∑
(dti − dti)2
)3/2
8 Note that when skewness is negative, an increasing Skew implies that the
istribution becomes less negatively skewed.
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ould be earned by investing the cash in alternative assets such
s loans; and second is the adjustment or transaction costs which
anks may incur in case of emergency borrowing or emergency
elling of assets. We use the lending rate, i.e., the bank rate that
sually meets the short- and medium-term financing needs of
he private sector- to proxy for the opportunity cost;9 and dis-
ount rate, i.e., the cost of borrowing at the central bank discount
indow- to proxy for the transaction cost.
Another key factor that may influence bank’s liquidity hold-
ng is the ease with which banks can access funding liquidity
o meet liquidity shortfalls. In large financial systems, banks
an access large volume of funding at relatively low trans-
ction costs. One measure of this size effect is the ratio of
iquid liabilities to GDP, which is equals to the sum of demand
nd interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-banks financial
ntermediaries, divided by the GDP.
Finally, we should recognize that depending on frictions and
onstraints on credit markets, such as lack of adequate demand
or credits, banks may hold reserves larger than what is required
or the precautionary motive. Hence, we extend our list of con-
rols with four additional variables. First is the (logarithm of)
ross domestic product (GDP), because larger economies might
ave larger credit demand. Second is the GDP growth, because,
s suggested in Djankov et al. (2007), rapid economic expansion
ould require more credit. Third is the annual growth rate of the
DP implicit deflator (a measure of inflation), since it is very
ikely that banks will lend less in economies with high inflation
see, Boyd et al., 2001). The fourth variable is the International
ountry Risk Guide (ICRG) composite risk rating, to control
or the overall quality of each country’s political and legal and
conomic conditions.10 We find that this last variable is highly
orrelated with direct measures of credit risk, such as bad loans
atio (correlation is −0.57, p value = 0.00), and depth of credit
nformation index11 (the correlation is 0.76, p  value = 0.00). We
se the ICRG rating because the availability of data is much
etter in the sample.
All the variables described in this sub-section are col-
ected from the WDI of the World Bank, with the exception
f the ICRG composite index which is from the PRS group
www.prsgroup.com).
9 We accommodate for the possibility of nonlinearities between the lending
ate and the reserve ratio, by including a quadratic term for the lending rate
ariable (Lending rate2). The motivation is simple: As shown in Stiglitz and
eiss (1981), lending rate affect the riskiness of loans, and there is an “optimal”
ate at which the expected return to the bank is maximized; above the “optimal”
ate, the best strategy for banks is to ration credit, which may imply that they
ncrease their holdings of liquid assets.
10 The ICRG composite risk rating covers a broad set of 22 variables in three
ubcategories of risk: political, economic, and financial. The scores on each of
he 22 risk components allow to create a risk rating for each of the three risk
ategories, which are then combined to produce the composite risk rating. The
omposite rating ranges from zero to 100. A rating of 100 points equates to very
ow risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. Source: www.prsgroup.com
11 This index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability
f more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to
acilitate lending decisions. Source: WDI.
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.3.  The  sample  and  some  descriptive  statistics
We focus our study on the 1994–2008 period.12 The dataset
ncludes 18 SSA countries for which we have been able to get
ufficient data to carry out regression analysis.
A quick glance at the raw data shows that there are a few
umber of extreme observations that make the range of some
ariables very large. For example, the lending rate varies from
0% to 103%, the discount rate from 5% to 150%, and the infla-
ion rate from −17% to 556%. We double-checked the original
ata sources for any reporting error on our part, but we confirmed
he entries.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our panel data
s well as the list of countries included in the sample. It gives
he mean, the median, the standard deviation and the range of
alues (minimum, maximum) of the variables described above.
ote that the panel is unbalanced, with the number of time-
eries observations varying substantially across countries. Also
ote that we have log-transformed some of the variables, namely
ending rate, GDP and inflation, to curtail the effects of extreme
alues. Finally, note that we have considered the ratio of discount
ate to lending rate (rather than the absolute level of the discount
ate), to mitigate multicollinearity -since the correlation between
he discount rate and the lending rate is 0.91 (p  value = 0.00).
his approach helps reduce the range of values; therefore, it
lso helps in adjusting for extreme points.
In the first row of the table, we see that the mean (median) of
ank reserve ratio in our sample is 15.898% (13.926%), with a
tandard deviation of 11.039. This shows that there is substan-
ial variation in the level of bank reserve ratios. There is also
ubstantial variation in our liquidity risk variables. Our data can
hus be used to identify the relationship between liquidity risk
actors and bank reserve ratio.
.  Econometric  analysis  and  results
This section explores the quantitative importance of the pre-
autionary motive in explaining the patterns of bank reserves in
8 SSA countries over the 1994–2008 period.
As a first piece of evidence, Fig. 2 plots bank reserve ratio
gainst our primary measure of deposit volatility (Vol). Countries
ith the highest levels of deposit volatility are Congo(Rep),
uinea-Bissau and Malawi, and these countries are also those
ith the highest levels of bank reserve ratios. South-Africa and
otswana are countries with the lowest levels of deposits volatil-
ty, and they are also the countries with the lowest levels of bank
eserve ratios. In overall, Fig. 2 shows that, on average, higher
12 The period starting in 1994 coincides with major reversal of the financial and
onetary policy frameworks of post-independence era, when African govern-
ents, through financial repression, determined directly the behaviour of banks
Allen et al., 2011). The new policy and institutional environment that emerged
llows for autonomous management of banking firms, which is a crucial feature
hat underlies our empirical analysis.
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variables Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Bank reserve ratio 15.898 13.926 11.039 2.172 76.682
Demand to time and saving deposit ratio 0.760 0.609 0.824 0.141 6.952
Deposit growth 2.138 1.718 2.289 −5.117 21.646
Deposit volatility (Vol) 0.581 0.414 0.623 0.080 4.265
Deposit skewness (Skew) 0.091 0.097 0.924 −3.007 3.283
ICRG composite risk score 62.894 62.347 8.634 36.458 84.479
Lending rate (logged) 3.153 3.030 0.453 2.363 4.636
Discount rate/lending rate 0.690 0.663 0.314 0.116 1.731
GDP (logged) 22.380 22.527 1.341 19.278 26.056
GDP growth 4.794 4.629 4.163 −10.240 22.7
Liquid liabilities/GDP 23.473 18.958 12.711 5.143 79.615
Inflation (logged) 2.394 2.399 1.157 −3.269 6.322
Notes: The sample covers 18 SSA countries over the period 1994–2008. The panel in unbalanced and the total number of observations is 194. The countries included
in the sample are: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo(Dem), Congo(Rep), Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique,
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
Angola
Botswana
Cameroon
CongoDem
CongoRep
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
GuineaBis
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mozambique Nigeria
SouthAfrica
TanzaniaUganda
Zambia
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evels of deposit volatility are associated with larger bank reserve
atios.13
We now turn to investigate whether this association is robust.
e first present the estimation method and, after that, the results.
.1.  Estimation  method
Our estimation approach involves using the more recent
ynamic system-GMM estimator due to Arellano and Bover
1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In fact, to account for the
act that “equilibrium” may not be achieved each time period, the
agged dependent variable is included as a regressor. In this case,
trict exogeneity no longer holds; thus, the straightforward ordi-
13 In graphs unreported here, we find a very similar pattern when we plot aver-
ge the bank reserve ratio against the average ratio of demand to time and saving
eposits. In contrast, the linear fits are much less steep with the average deposit
rowth and the average deposit skewness variables, even when we discarded the
xtreme points.
a
w
t
c
r
i
w deposit volatility.
ary least squares (OLS) and the Fixed-effects OLS estimators
ould be biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2008). In contrast,
he system-GMM estimator allows obtaining efficient estimates
hile controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
nother key advantage of this estimator is that it is useful to
itigate potential endogeneity issues.
In implementing the system-GMM method, we take a num-
er of steps to improve identification as much as possible. First,
e alleviate concerns with reverse causality by lagging our
xplanatory variables one-period, except the liquidity risk vari-
14bles since they are computed using lagged data. Second,
e choose forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) rather than
he first-difference transformation because the former has the
14 Recall that for each year, our liquidity risk variables (see Section 3.1) are
omputed using monthly data of the same year. As such, they are less prone to
everse causality, since reserve ratios are recorded at the end of the year, and there
s no obvious reason – except the strong assumption of rational expectations-
hy current levels of bank reserves may influence past deposit inflows.
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tude is virtually unchanged: 8.176 in column (2), and 8.053 in
column (5).
15 Alternatively, we check the sensitivity to outliers by winsorizing the liquidity
risk variables at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. The results we find are qual-
itatively similar to those reported here, even when the liquidity risk variables
are winsorized at the 5th and the 95th percentiles, or when all the variables are
winsorized.
16 The cases of South-Africa and Congo (Rep) are obvious from Fig. 2: South-
Africa is the country with the lowest levels of both deposit volatility and reserve
ratios; Congo (Rep) is the country with the highest levels of both deposit volatility
and reserve ratio. The same is true with the ratio of demand to time and saving
deposits. With regard to Angola, we have noticed that it is the country with the
highest levels of both deposit growth and inflation. In fact, the maximum value4 P.V. Nketcha Nana, L. Samson / Revie
irtue of preserving sample size in panels with gaps as ours
see Arellano and Bover, 1995). Third, we restrict the set of
nternal instruments by using only certain lags instead of all
vailable lags for valid instruments, and by invoking the “col-
apse” option in “xtabond2”. Suggested by Roodman (2009)
nd Wintoki et al. (2012), these techniques allow us to address
he issue of “instrument proliferation” that may over-fit endoge-
ous variables in system-GMM estimations; also, they make
he tests of over-identifying restrictions more powerful. We
se lagged variables in levels dated t  −  3 to t −  4, and lagged
ariables in first-differences dated t −  2 to t  −  3 as “internal”
nstruments.
Finally, we supplement the system GMM “internal”
nstruments with one “external” instrument: the political sub-
omponent of the ICRG composite risk index. The validity of
his instrument relies on two facts: (i) political risk represents
 substantial component of the overall ICRG risk rating; and
ii) political risk is largely determined “out of the system”. The
rst fact is obvious; it means that fluctuations in political risk
re a significant source of fluctuations in the ICRG composite
ndex. The second fact relies on the presumption, laid out in
cemoglu et al. (2005), that political institutions may be think
s the state variable which determines economic institutions
nd outcomes, that political institutions are themselves endoge-
ous, determined by economic institutions and outcomes. This
eans that fluctuations in political institutions in a given year
re largely determined by fluctuations in economic outcomes in
revious years, and so are unlikely to be correlated with shocks
o economic outcomes, such as bank reserves, in the current
ear.
To assess the validity of instruments, we use and report
he Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and the
rellano and Bond (1991) serial auto-correlation tests.
.2.  Results
Our system-GMM regression results are reported in Table 2.
n parentheses are standard errors, which are robust, clustered
t country level, to correct for the presence of any pattern of
eteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within the panel. Year
ummies are included in all the regressions and in each case,
hey are jointly significant statistically, at the 1% level.
In column (1) we present our benchmark system-GMM esti-
ates. These results show that both the estimated coefficients
or deposit volatility (Vol) and for demand to time and saving
eposits ratio are highly significant statistically, at the 1% level.
he estimated coefficients for deposit growth trend and for dis-
ount rate are also statistically significant, but only marginally,
t the 10% level.
In column (2) we repeat the same regression as in column (1),
ut adding our “external” instrument as described above. This
as little effects on the results. In fact, the statistically signifi-
ant coefficients and their significance levels are the same as in
olumn (1). Only the magnitude of the coefficients are affected.
or example, the coefficient of deposit volatility (Vol) increases
rom 7.709 to 8.176; and the coefficient of the demand to time
nd saving deposit ratio increases from 5.643 to 6.210. We may
o
1
(
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nterpret these results as consistent with the argument that our
nitial system-GMM estimates are relatively robust.
In columns (3)–(5), we assess to what extent our results
re sensitive to outliers. We should note that for this exercise,
e rerun the same specification as in column (2), dropping
ne country at a time.15 For brevity, we report the results for
hree cases which appeared to be the most sensitive; namely
outh-Africa, Congo(Rep), and Angola, respectively in columns
3)–(5). Worth noting, these three countries are also the most
xtreme outliers in our sample.16 It may also be worth noting that
he three results, from columns (3) to (5), are illustrative enough
f the changes we encountered in the sensitivity analysis.
In column (3), when South-Africa is excluded from the
ample, the most significant changes in the results are in the coef-
cient for discount rate and in that for liquid liabilities to GDP
atio (LL/GDP), which become stronger statistically: the statisti-
al significance of the coefficient for discount rate increases from
he 10% level to the 5% level; and the coefficient on LL/GDP
ecome marginally significant, at the 10% level.
In column (4), when Congo (Rep) is excluded, only the
emand to time and saving deposit ratio and deposit volatility
Vol) variables display statistical significance at conventional
evels, respectively at the 10% level and the 1% level. The coef-
cient on discount rate has decreased substantially, from 17.724
o 6.607, and has lost its statistical significance. The coefficient
n Vol  has also decreased but in a much smaller proportion, from
.176 (see column (2)) to 7.711. In contrast, the coefficient on
he demand to time and saving deposit ratio has become weaker
tatistically although its magnitude increased by almost 50%
from 6.210 to 9.034).
Finally, in column (5), when Angola is excluded, the only
ignificant change is in the coefficient on the deposit growth
ariable, which decreases substantially in magnitude, by almost
0%, and looses its (marginal) statistical significance. Both the
oefficients on the demand to time and saving deposit ratio
nd the discount rate variables also decrease in magnitude, but
hey maintain the same statistical significance as in column (2).
ith regard to deposit volatility (Vol), the estimated coefficient
emains statistically significant at the 1% level, and its magni-f the deposit growth variable in the sample is 21.646, and the 99th percentile is
2.752; these values are from Angola. Moreover, the maximum value of inflation
log of inflation) in the sample is 556.939% (6.322), and the 99th percentile is
18.232% (6.036); these values are also from Angola.
P.V. Nketcha Nana, L. Samson / Review of Development Finance 4 (2014) 29–37 35
Table 2
Econometric results.
Sensitivity to outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
The dependent variable is bank reserve ratio
Lag1 dep. var. 0.610*** 0.594*** 0.612*** 0.648*** 0.645***
(0.117) (0.108) (0.119) (0.126) (0.086)
Deposit volatility (Vol) 7.709*** 8.176*** 8.109*** 7.711*** 8.053***
(1.859) (2.030) (1.682) (2.871) (2.143)
Demand to time and saving deposit ratio (lagged) 5.643*** 6.210*** 5.319*** 9.034* 5.253***
(1.840) (1.429) (1.331) (5.119) (1.761)
Deposit growth −0.871* −0.845* −0.869* −0.476 −0.397
(0.516) (0.486) (0.457) (0.470) (0.754)
Deposit skewness (Skew) 0.907 0.203 0.131 −2.115 0.114
(2.540) (2.012) (2.467) (2.769) (2.187)
I(Skew > 0) 5.119 5.157 4.688 1.370 5.213
(4.255) (4.259) (4.205) (2.816) (4.273)
Skew *I(Skew > 0) −5.198 −3.785 −2.621 0.118 −2.252
(5.520) (4.199) (4.010) (4.880) (4.143)
ICRG composite risk (lagged) −0.180 −0.054 −0.016 0.094 −0.159
(0.285) (0.184) (0.224) (0.144) (0.203)
Lending rate (lagged) −14.015 −27.909 −36.914 −34.041 −80.321
(56.361) (53.876) (55.476) (24.795) (55.689)
Lending rate2 (lagged) 2.341 4.327 5.572 5.186 12.191
(7.893) (7.573) (7.660) (3.478) (8.294)
Discount rate (lagged) 16.955* 17.524* 16.974** 6.607 13.088*
(9.098) (9.272) (8.474) (4.658) (6.845)
GDP (lagged) −1.828 −2.261 −2.870 −1.512 −1.266
(1.540) (1.436) (2.156) (1.380) (1.283)
GDP Growth (lagged) −0.939 −0.838 −0.864 0.130 −1.372
(0.850) (0.736) (0.694) (0.171) (0.892)
Liquid liabilities/GDP (lagged) −0.253 −0.251 −0.328* −0.138 −0.093
(0.165) (0.159) (0.182) (0.137) (0.082)
Inflation (lagged) −3.968 −3.724 −3.781 −0.060 −2.697
(2.659) (2.505) (2.339) (1.151) (2.263)
Constant 89.620 111.793 142.227 81.303 177.724
(108.415) (108.771) (141.737) (67.613) (114.032)
Number of obs. 172 172 158 163 161
Number of time period 15 15 15 15 15
Number of countries 18 17 17 17 17
Sargan test, p value 0.248 0.241 0.301 0.879 0.176
AR1, p value 0.046 0.041 0.042 0.032 0.093
AR2, p value 0.118 0.110 0.117 0.250 0.444
External IV NO YES YES YES YES
Implied cumulative effects
Demand to time and saving deposit ratio (lagged) 14.469** 15.295*** 13.708** 25.665 14.797***
Deposit volatility (Vol) 17.960*** 20.138*** 20.899*** 21.906** 22.684***
Notes: The estimates are from system-GMM regressions with robust standard errors clustered at country-level shown in parentheses. Year dummies are included
in all regressions. The sample includes 18 SSA countries over the period 1994–2008. The regression in column (2) is the same as in column (1) but with our
“external” instrument included. The regressions in columns (3)–(5) are the same as in column (2), but excluding South Africa, Congo (Rep), and Angola, respectively.
The implied cumulative effects in the bottom lines are computed as follows: marginal effect/(1−coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable), and the
corresponding p value are obtained from the non-linear test of significance.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
o
e
l
t
a
t
o
M
the p  values are reported in the table, do not point to significant
problem with the instrument sets.17** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
We should note in passing that throughout the five columns
f Table 2, all the statistically significant coefficients are of the
xpected signs. In addition, the coefficient associated with the
agged dependent variable is always positive and highly statis-
ically significant. Its magnitude, which varies between 0.594
nd 0.648, can be seen as evidence of persistence. Finally, all
he regressions in Table 2 are supported by the diagnostic tests
f instrument validity suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). core specifically, the Sargan and the AR1/AR2 tests, for which17 The Sargan test cannot reject the null of instrument validity; and the serial
orrelation tests reject the null of the absence of first order serial correlation
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In overall, the results reported in Table 2 show that the esti-
ated coefficient for deposit volatility (Vol) is strongly robust:
oth its statistical significance and its economic magnitude do
ot change substantially across all regressions, from columns (1)
o (5). The estimates suggest that deposit volatility has a pos-
tive and highly statistically significant effect on bank reserve
atios. This effect is also economically significant. For example,
 one standard deviation reduction in Vol  (0.623, see Table 1)
ill reduce reserve ratios by approximately 5% points in the
ame year. This impact persists through the dynamics of reserve
atios, since the estimated coefficient on lagged dependent vari-
ble is positive and highly significant statistically. The estimated
umulative effect of a one standard deviation reduction in deposit
olatility amounts to a reduction in reserve ratios by 11 to 13%
oints, and passes the statistical significance test at conventional
evels (see the bottom line of Table 2).
We may also gauge the economic significance of the esti-
ated impact of deposit volatility by comparing two cases taken
rom our sample, namely Kenya and Malawi. Over the study
eriod, the average value of deposit volatility (Vol) is much lower
n Kenya (0.152) than in Malawi (0.707). Given this difference,
nd other things being equal, our estimates of the implied cumu-
ative effects predict that the average reserve ratio in Malawi
ould be higher than that in Kenya by 10 to 12% points. For
omparison, the average reserve ratio in Malawi (25.263%) is
ctually higher than that in Kenya by 14.068% points.
With regard to the other regressors included as controls, par-
icularly the demand to time and saving deposit ratio, the deposit
rowth, the discount rate and the LL/GDP variables, empirical
vidence of their effects on bank reserve ratios is somewhat frag-
le. Indeed, across the regressions reported in Table 2, we notice
ome variations in the estimated coefficients of those regressors,
ither in the statistical significance or in the economic magnitude
r in both.
In results unreported here, we check robustness of these
esults against alternative econometric techniques. In particular,
e repeat the regressions in Table 2 using the straightforward
LS and the FE-OLS methods. In spite of the shortcomings of
hese methods, we find that the overall results are qualitatively
imilar to those reported here.
.  Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to assess empirically to what
xtent the holding of large amounts of liquid assets by banks
n Africa can be attributable to liquidity risk. We construct a
ime-varying measure of deposit volatility, which we use as our
rimary approach to capture the exposure of banks to liquidity
isk. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 18 SSA
ountries over the 1994–2008 period. The estimation strategy
nvolves using dynamic panel data techniques and controlling
or potential outliers and endogeneity biases.
AR1 test) and not reject the absence of second order serial correlation (AR2
est).
D
D
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We find a strong positive association between higher levels
f deposit volatility and large bank reserve ratios. This result
mplies that deposit volatility in Africa significantly reduces the
raction of deposits banks can channel to borrowers, given that
anks should invest in unproductive liquid assets to self-insure
gainst unpredictable liquidity demand from depositors. Future
esearch may need to assess to what extent this affects credit
vailability.
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